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Abstract 
Unemployment benefits, benefit duration, base period and qualifying pe-
riod are constituent parameters of the unemployment insurance system in 
most OECD countries. From economic research we know that the amount 
and duration of unemployment benefits increase unemployment. To ana-
lyze the effects of the other two parameters we use a matching model 
with search frictions and show that there is a trade-off between the quali-
fying and the base period on the one hand and the amount and duration 
of the unemployment benefits on the other. A country that combines a 
high level of unemployment benefits with a long benefit duration can neu-
tralize the effect on the equilibrium rate of unemployment with a long 
qualifying and/or a short base period. 
Keywords: Matching model, unemployment insurance, base period, quali-
fying period, labor market policy 
JEL-Code: J41, J64, J68 
 
We are grateful to Herbert Brücker, Robert Hall, Julie L. Hotchkiss, Rüdi-
ger Wapler and the participants of the Annual Congresses of the Royal 
Economic Society 2004, European Association of Labour Economists 2004, 
Scottish Economic Society 2005, International Conference on Policy Mod-
eling 2005, European Economic Association 2005 and Society of Labor 
Economists 2006 for their valuable and helpful comments. 
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1 Introduction 
Base and qualifying period are constituent parameters of the unemploy-
ment insurance system in most of the OECD countries. A worker must 
complete the qualifying period within a statutory base period in order to 
obtain a claim for unemployment benefits (UB). The qualifying period is 
often described as a rule having a financing and an information function, 
which reduces the moral hazard of the unemployed. The longer the quali-
fying period, the lower the likelihood that workers will register as ‘false’ 
unemployed to capture UB and the higher the accumulated contributions 
to the unemployment insurance, when they once will claim benefit pay-
ments. Table 1 shows the qualifying and the base period of the US, Great 
Britain, Japan, and some of the Continental European countries. For ex-
ample, Italy and Germany apply a rule, where a worker must have been 
employed at least for 12 months during the last 2 years in order to be eli-
gible for UB. The qualifying period is much shorter in France and the Neth-
erlands than in Germany or Italy; this is also true for the base period in 
the Netherlands. 
Table 1: Characteristics of the unemployment insurance system in selected 
OECD countries 20021) 
 Qualifying Period 
(months) 
Base Period 
(months) 
Max. Benefit  
Duration (months) 
Denmark 12 36 48 
France 4 18 30 
Germany (2006) 12 24 12 
Italy 12 24 6 
Japan 6 12 10 
Netherlands 6 9 18 
Spain 12 72 24 
UK 24 n.a. 6 
USA (2006) 12 16 6 
1) for a 40 year old single worker without children, with 22-year employment career 
Source: OECD 2004, US Department of Labor 
 
Of the four parameters – base period, qualifying period, UB and benefit 
duration – we know from economic theory (Mortensen 1977, Mortensen 
and Pissarides 1999, Pissarides 2000, Rogerson et. al 2005) and empirical 
research (Atkinson and Micklewright 1991, Layard et al. 1991, Nickell and 
Layard 1999, Nickell et al. 2005) that the amount and the duration of UB 
increase the equilibrium rate of unemployment. While the literature has 
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focused on the impact of the amount and duration of UB on the unem-
ployment rate, there seems to be neither theoretical nor empirical re-
search on the base and the qualifying period. To analyze the effects of the 
two parameters, we use a Mortensen-Pissarides type (MP) matching 
model with search frictions (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994, Pissarides 
2000) and show that there exists a trade-off between the qualifying period 
and the base period, on the one hand, and the amount and the duration of 
UB, on the other. Therefore, it is possible for a country to offer its job 
seekers a high level of UB with a long benefit duration, while neutralizing 
the effect on the equilibrium rate of unemployment with a long qualifying 
period and/or a short base period. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the MP-model with 
a finite benefit duration. In Section 3, we integrate the base period and 
the qualifying period into the modified MP-model. Section 4 presents nu-
merical simulations. Section 5 concludes. A graphical presentation of the 
simulation results can be found in the Appendix I. Appendices II-IV pre-
sent the proofs of the propositions.  
2 Benefit Duration T 
The time structure of the model is discrete. Job creation takes place at the 
beginning of a period and job destruction at the end of a period. At the 
beginning of a period, a continuum of applicants look for suitable vacan-
cies. When a worker and a vacancy meet, they negotiate the employment 
contract and begin production. At the end of the period, the output is sold, 
the wage is paid and the match partners decide on whether to continue 
the job. Idiosyncratic shocks which are caused by shifts in product de-
mand or by a change of the unit costs of production affect the productivity 
of the match. If the productivity is too low, the job is destroyed and the 
worker becomes unemployed. Eligible job seekers receive UB, which are 
paid as a flat rate at the end of a period. 
The labor force is represented as a unit mass, each worker is either em-
ployed or unemployed, hence ue +=1 , where e denotes the pool of em-
ployed and u the pool of unemployed. Out of the e employed, ( )eRGλ  lose 
their job at the end of a period. )(RGλ  is the endogenous separation rate, 
where λ is the probability of a job-specific shock x. ( )xG , with the support 
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10 ≤≤≤ xα , is the distribution function of x. α≥R  is the endogenous 
reservation productivity and yx  is the real output of the job, with the 
maximum productivity 0>y . Worker and firm prefer the same separation 
rule: If Rx ≥ , the job is continued. If Rx < , the job is destroyed. Since R 
is endogenous and x is bounded from below, worker and firm can avoid 
job destruction by agreeing on the reservation productivity α=R . The u 
job seekers apply if they meet a vacancy. Job seekers apply at most once 
per period and vacancies receive no more than one application. 
Unemployment incidence. Job search takes place at the beginning of a pe-
riod. Job seekers, who lost their job at the end of the previous period and 
do not find a re-engagement, form the inflow I of the pool of unemployed: 
( ) ( )eRGpI λ−≡ 1 , where p is the transition probability into employment, 
10 << p . We call ( ) ( )RGp λ−1  the ex-post-incidence. The unemployment 
incidence ( )RGλ  comprises, in addition to the ex-post-incidence, job seek-
ers who find a re-engagement immediately after losing their previous job, 
as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )RGpRGpRG λλλ −+= 1 , where ( )RGpλ  is the fraction of the job-to-
job transitions. 
Unemployment Insurance. Workers without a job register with the unem-
ployment insurance [ ]bT, , which has the following two properties.  
(A1) [Employed Worker]. As in the MP-model each employed worker is 
entitled to claim UB 0>b  if laid off. In contrast to the MP-model the 
benefit duration is limited to 0≥T  periods. 
(A2) [Job Seekers]. jTu −  is the pool of job seekers with a residual bene-
fit duration of 0≥− jT  periods. j is the current spell of unemployment, 
Tj ,,0 K= . An additional period of unemployment raises the current spell 
from j to 1+j  periods, reduces the counter of the residual claims to 
( ) 01 ≥+− jT  and places the unemployed into pool ( )1+− jTu . Job seekers, 
who have not found a job T or more periods after losing their previous 
employment, lose their eligibility to UB and form the job seeker pool 0u . 
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2.1 Equilibrium Rate of Unemployment 
Job seekers from the pool Tu , who lost their job at the end of the previous 
period, are entitled to UB for T periods. From (A1) and (A2) it follows that 
the inflow I is identical to the pool Tu , so that ( ) ( )eRGpuT λ−= 1 . Those job 
seekers from Tu , who still have no job at the succeeding period, form by 
(A2) the pool 1−Tu . For the pool of job seekers with a counter of residual 
claims equal to jT − , we have in the steady state 
(1) ( ) ( )eRGpu jjT λ11 +− −= , 1,,0 −= Tj K .  
Since 1<p , jTu −  strictly decreases with an increasing spell length j. 
Of the unemployed in the pool 0u , 0pu  find a job. Thus we have in the 
steady state: =0pu  ( ) ( )eRGp T λ11 +− . From this steady state condition, we 
can derive 0u   
(2) 
( ) ( )eRG
p
p
u
T
λ
1
0
1 +−= .  
Finally, we obtain the aggregate pool of job seekers u from 
(3) ∑
=
−=
T
j
jTuu
0
. 
Matching function. The labor market is a search market. ( )vum ,  repre-
sents the matching technology of the market, where m is the number of 
jobs filled with an input of u job seekers and v vacancies. The matching 
function is linear homogenous, concave and monotone in both arguments. 
For a given vacancy, ( ) ( ) ( ) vvummq ,1,1 =≡ θθ  is the probability of an ap-
plication, where the ratio of vacancies to job seekers, uv=θ , is the tight-
ness of the labor market. For a given job seeker, ( ) ( )θθθ qp =  is the transi-
tion probability into employment. For convenience, we will write ( )θqq =  
and ( )θpp = . 
Inserting (1) and (2) into (3) gives the equilibrium rate of unemployment 
as a function of the tightness and the reservation productivity 
(4) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )θλθ λθθ pRGp RGpRu +− −= 1 1, . 
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The parameters of the unemployment insurance T and b do not affect u 
directly, but rather through the ex-post-incidence, ( ) )(1 RGp λ−  and the 
duration of unemployment, p1 . 
2.2 Job Creation 
Filled Jobs. An employment contract ( ) ],,[ Rxww jT −  has three components. 
jTw −  is the outside wage the worker earns in the first period. The outside 
wage depends on the residual claims of the job seeker. If the negotiations 
fail, the worker receives UB b for up to another jT −  periods, Tj ,,0 K= . 
The second component of the contract is the match specific inside wage 
with the wage function [ ] ℜ→1,: Rw . At the end of a period, the succeed-
ing periods’ productivity yx is revealed to the match. If [ ]1,Rx ∈ , the 
match is continued and the worker gets paid ( )xw .1 The third component 
of the contract shows the reservation productivity R at which the job will 
be destroyed. 
Continuation periods. Job-specific shocks hit a match with probability 
0≥λ . A job will be affected by no more than one shock per period, where 
shocks are iid. 
Let ( )xΠ  be the present value of a filled job after the manifestation of 
[ ]1,α∈x . Worker and firm are both interested in continuing the match as 
long as ( ) 0≥Π x  and agree on job destruction as soon as ( ) 0<Π x , as will 
be shown below. Since ( )xΠ  is a continuously increasing function of x, a 
reservation threshold R exists, for which 
(5) ( ) 0=Π R . 
Only jobs with Rx ≥  will be continued. 
                                                
1 Mortensen/Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) present a discussion of objections 
against the plausibility of this assumption and the two-tier wage structure which re-
sults from the possibility of renegotiation. 
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We assume that the firm sells the output yx at the end of the period at 
the same time as it pays the wage ( )xw . Then the steady state equation 
for the present value ( )xΠ  is 
(6) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −++−= ∫ xhdGhxwyxx
R
ΠλΠλρΠ 1
1
. 
Flow and stock variables are discounted at the factor ρ , where 
( ) 1110 <+=< rρ  with the real interest rate 0>r . The job is hit by a 
shock with probability λ  and changes into state h. If 1≤≤ hR , the match 
is continued and the continuation value becomes ( )hΠ . The match specific 
productivity does not change with probability λ−1 . 
A worker employed at the productivity x earns the wage ( )xw , and his 
human capital has the present value ( )xW . The asset pricing equation for 
the worker is  
(7) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++= ∫ xWURGhdGhWxwxW T
R
λλρ 1
1
. 
With probability λ  a shock arrives and the match draws the productivity 
h. If Rh ≥ , the value of the worker is ( )hW  and the match continues. If, 
on the other hand, Rh < , which happens with probability ( )RG , the job is 
destroyed, the worker becomes unemployed and the value of his human 
capital is TU  (see Equation (13)). 
Initial period. Firms choose the initial productivity 1=x  when they set up 
a match and negotiate the outside wage. If the firm meets a worker with a 
current spell of unemployment of length j, then the market value jT −Π  of 
the newly filled job is  
(8) ( ) ( ) ]1[1 jTjT ww −− −+= ρΠΠ , Tj ,,0 K= , 
where jTw −  is the outside wage, ( )1Π  is the continuation value (6) and 
)1(w  is the inside wage of a job with the productivity 1=x . 
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The market value of an entrant with a current spell of unemployment of 
length j is with respect of the asset Equation (7) and the outside wage 
jTw − : 
(9) ( ) ( )]1[1 wwWW jTjT −+= −− ρ , Tj ,,0 K= . 
Job creation. Entrance into the labor market is free for all vacancies, but 
open only at the beginning of a period. The flow of vacancies persists until 
the present value of a vacancy is zero. Considering this infinitely elastic 
supply of vacancies, the job creation condition is 
(10) ∑
=
−−+−=
T
j
jTjTqk
0
0 Πμ , 
where k denotes the flow costs for advertising a vacancy, q is the prob-
ability of meeting a job seeker, jT −μ  the conditional probability that the 
applicant will have a current spell of unemployment of length j and jT −Π  
the value of the newly filled job according to Equation (8). 
All job seekers search for jobs with the same intensity. Therefore, 
uu jTjT −− =μ  denotes the probability with which a vacancy will meet a job 
seeker with a current spell of unemployment of length j. Taking into ac-
count the pool Equations (1), (2) and (4), the following relationship holds 
(11) 
( )
( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=−
−=−=−
Tjp
Tjpp
T
j
jT
,1
1,,0,1 Kμ  
2.3 Wage Negotiation and Job Destruction 
Value of unemployment. Unemployed who are not eligible for UB have the 
value 0U , where in the steady state 
(12) ( ) ( )000 1 UzppWU +−+= ρ . 
The job seeker finds a job with probability p, and his human capital takes 
on the initial value 0W  (see Equation (9)). If he is not matched, the utility 
from leisure is equal to z.  
The human capital of a job seeker with a current spell of unemployment of 
length j has the value jTU − . In the steady state, the first-order linear in-
homogeneous difference equation for jTU −  is 
(13) ( ) ( )][1 1+−−− ++−+= jTjTjT UbzppWU ρ , 1,,0 −= Tj K . 
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The human capital of the outsider, who meets a vacancy, has the value 
jTW −  (see Equation (9)). If the job seeker does not meet a vacancy, he 
receives the UB b in addition to the utility of leisure z, the counter of the 
current spell of unemployment increases to 1+j  and his human capital 
takes on the value ( )1+− jTU . 
Wage negotiations. Job search takes time and causes search costs. There-
fore, as a consequence of search frictions, each match generates a posi-
tive monopoly rent, which is distributed between the match partners 
through the wage. The sharing rule is obtained according to the general-
ized Nash solution to a bargaining problem, with ( )1,0∈β  denoting the 
bargaining strength of the job seeker. 
Taking into account the idiosyncratic productivity shock [ ]1,Rx ∈ , the res-
ervation utility of the insider TU , and the fact that the asset price of a va-
cancy is equal to zero in the steady state, the sharing rule implemented 
by the negotiations with an insider is 
(14) ( ) ( )xUxW T Πβ
β
−=− 1 . 
( ) TUxW −  denotes the worker’s contribution and ( )xΠ  the firm’s contribu-
tion to the total surplus of the job. 
The job rent of a match with an outsider, who has a current spell of un-
employment of length j, will be shared according to the following rule 
(15) jTjTjT UW −−− −=− Πβ
β
1
, Tj ,,0 K= , 
where the asset Equations (8), (9), (12) and (13) give the initial values of 
the outsider, jTW − , the newly filled job, jT −Π , and the value of the unem-
ployed at the time of wage negotiations, jTU − . Proves of the following 
lemmas 1. – 3. can be found in Appendix II. 
Lemma 1 [Bargained Wages]. In view of the reservation income TrU  of the 
insider and the value jTU −  of the job seekers with a current spell of unemploy-
ment of length j, the agents negotiate the following inside and outside wages.  
(i) [Inside Wage] The bargained inside wage at a match specific productivity [ ]1,Rx ∈  is  
(16) ( ) ( )TT rUyxrUxw −+= β . 
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(ii) [Outside Wage] An outsider with a current spell of unemployment of length 
j, who produces in the first period with productivity 1=x , earns the wage 
(17) ( ) ( )( ) 111 −−− −−−= ρβ jTTjT UUww , Tj ,,0 K= , 
where ( )1w  is the inside wage (16) for 1=x , and r+=− 11ρ . 
By Equation (16) the inside wage equals the reservation income of the 
worker plus a share of the current match rent that depends on his bar-
gaining strength β. 
Should an outsider with a current spell of unemployment of length j find a 
job, then the guarantee value of his human capital increases by the 
amount of the differential rent jTT UU −− . As the wage Equation (17) illus-
trates, the firm which places the outsider under contract takes the fraction 
β−1  of this rent. 
The job destruction condition can be derived by evaluating the asset 
Equation (6) at the reservation threshold Rx =  to obtain: 
Lemma 2 (i) [Filled Jobs]. The continuation value of a filled job producing with 
the idiosyncratic productivity [ ]1,Rx ∈  is 
(18) ( ) ( )
r
Rx
yx +
−−= λβΠ 1 . 
 
(ii) [Job Destruction Rule]. The job destruction rule is 
(19) ( ) ( ) ( )∫−−=
1
1 R
T hdGh
yy
rU
R Πβ
λ
. 
As the job destruction condition (19) illustrates, the current reservation 
output of a match is lower than its permanent reservation income. Since 
the firm can destroy the job at no charge (free disposal) and the supply of 
vacancies is infinitely elastic, the reservation income of the match is iden-
tical with the reservation wage of the worker, TrU . Therefore, when the 
job produces the reservation output yR, the match suffers a current loss 
equal to the integral expression in (19). The option value of the filled job 
is the reason why the match partners are willing to accept this loss. 
In order to close the model, we still have to determine the reservation 
wage of the different types of unemployed. The unemployment insurance 
[ ]bT,  creates a discrete distribution with 1+T  types in the pool of job 
seekers. The job seekers differ with respect to their residual entitlement to 
UB and in turn in their reservation utility and the outside wages they are 
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able to demand when matched to a vacancy. Given the distribution of the 
market values of the 1+T  job seeker types, we finally can derive the dis-
tribution of the initial values of the filled jobs. 
Lemma 3 (i) [Reservation Wage]. From the asset equations for the job 
seekers, the sharing rules and the equations for the initial values, we obtain the 
distribution of the reservation wage of the 1+T  job seeker types with 
(20) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] 111111 −−−− −−+−−+−+= ρβΠββ jTTjTjT UUppbdzrU , Tj ,,0 K=  
 where ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( )1,011 1 ∈−− −≡ θβ ρθθ ppd . 
 
(ii) [Initial Values]. The distribution of the initial values of occupied jobs is ob-
tained from 
(21) ( ) ( )( )jTTjT UU −− −−+= βΠΠ 11 , Tj ,,0 K= . 
As (20) and (21) show, while, ceteris paribus, the reservation wage of a 
job seeker with a current spell of unemployment of length j decreases, the 
value of a job filled with an outsider with the same current spell increases 
monotonically with j. As a result, the unemployed without benefit entitle-
ment from pool 0u  have the lowest market value of all job seekers, while 
correspondingly jobs filled by unemployed workers without entitlement 
have the highest market value of all newly formed jobs.  
2.4 Solution and Labor Market Policy 
The equilibrium of the search model consists of solutions 
( ) ],,,,1[ uRU jT θΠ − , =j T,,0 K , to the Equations (10), (18) – (20) and the 
equilibrium unemployment rate (4). Like the standard MP-model the en-
hanced model has two independent endogenous variables, the reservation 
productivity R and the labor market tightness θ. To solve for these two 
unknowns we can use the job destruction condition (19), which is in view 
of the income Equation (20) and the asset Equation (18) an equation in 
],[ Rθ . The second key equation of the model is the job creation condition 
(10), which depends after eliminating the transition probabilities with (11) 
and the initial values of a filled job with the asset Equations (21) on ],[ Rθ . 
The asset Equations (20) and (21) make use of the ‘entitlement rents’ 
jTT UU −− , Tj ,,1 K= . The entitlement rents result from ‘institutional fric-
tions’, which are created by the public unemployment insurance system. 
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All the T entitlement rents are functions of the labor market tightness, as 
follows from the asset Equations (20).  
Labor Market Policy. The following proposition characterizes the impact of 
the policy parameter T. An increase in the benefit duration T raises the 
fraction of job seekers with a long residual duration of benefit entitlement. 
Their reservation wage increases and, consequently, the outside wages 
they demand increase too. The initial values of the newly established firms 
fall and the supply of vacancies declines. In turn, the tightness of the la-
bor market decreases and the duration of unemployment p1  rises. In ad-
dition, the ex-post-incidence ( ) ( )RGp λ−1  increases. The rising duration of 
unemployment and the higher ex-post-incidence are each sufficient to 
raise the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The Figures 3a–c in Appendix 
I for 1=E  illustrate the argument. 
3 Qualifying Period and Base Period 
In the unemployment insurance [ ]bTFE ,,,  with qualifying period 2≥E  
and base period EF ≥ , workers who lose their job before completing the 
qualifying period have no claim to UB. In order to model the insurance, we 
introduce the following five assumptions (A1) – (A5), where (A1) – (A4) 
deal with the qualifying period E and (A5) describes the role of the base 
period F. 
3.1 Qualifying Period E 
(A1) [Completed Qualifying Period]. The qualifying period of a worker 
is completed, if he was employed for at least 2≥E  periods during the 
base period F. An unemployed person with a completed qualifying period 
is entitled to T payments of the UB b.  
(A2) [Transferability]. Residual claims for UB from earlier unemploy-
ment spells are lost. Qualifying points are intertemporally transferable.  
(A3) [Employed worker]. Each employed worker is characterized by a 
tupel ],[ CiE − . The counter 0≥− iE  shows the number of currently ac-
cumulated qualifying points of the worker; i denotes the number of un-
completed qualifying time periods, with ,,0 K=i 1−E  and { }TC ,0∈  is a 
binary variable and either equal to T or zero – depending on whether the 
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qualifying period is completed and the worker is entitled to UB or not. 
During an uncompleted qualifying period, an additional period of employ-
ment raises the counter of the qualifying points from iE −  to 
( ) EiE ≤−− 1 . 
(A4) [Job Seekers]. Each job seeker is characterized by a tupel 
[ ]jTiE −− , : The counter 0≥− iE  shows the number of currently accu-
mulated qualifying points and 0≥− jT  the residual benefit duration, 
where Tj ,,0 K= . An additional period of unemployment of a job seeker, 
who still owns residual benefit claims, raises the length of the current spell 
of unemployment from j to 1+j  and reduces the counter for the residual 
benefit duration from jT −  to ( ) 01 ≥+− jT . 
3.2 Base Period F and Waiting Time 
With given UB b the reservation utility of an applicant, his initial wage as 
well as the initial market value of a filled job depend on the following 
three attributes of the insurance system [ ]bTFE ,,, : First, the accumulated 
qualifying points iE − ; second, the distribution of the iE −  employment 
periods over the base period F;  and third, the counter of the residual 
benefit duration jT − . The longer the residual benefit duration, or the 
higher the number of accumulated qualifying points, or the sooner the job 
seeker will complete the qualifying period (i.e. the shorter his waiting 
time), the higher his wage demand will be during the initial contract nego-
tiations. 
The length of the waiting time of a job seeker with characteristics 
,[ iE − ]jT −  is the time that passes until his next benefit entitlement be-
gins. The waiting time is a random variable, which depends on the accu-
mulated qualifying points iE −  and on the distribution of the iE −  em-
ployment periods over the base period F, as we will explain in more detail 
in the following sections. The longer F is, the greater, ceteris paribus, is 
the number of different employment careers with exactly iE −  qualifying 
points and the greater is the range of the distribution of different waiting 
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times of otherwise identical job seekers.2 There are two cases to distin-
guish. 
First, if EF = , there is exactly one employment career which meets the 
qualification requirement: Only those workers who were continuously em-
ployed for at least E periods are eligible to UB. Second, if EF > , then the 
number of different employment careers with a current counter of 
0≥− iE  qualifying points is possibly very large, as is indicated by the fol-
lowing simple example. Let A and B be two job seekers with identical 
qualifying counters 0≥− iE . Assume that both remain unemployed in the 
next period and, moreover, that A was employed F periods ago, while B 
was not. Then A loses one qualifying point and faces the counter ( )1+− iE  
at the end of the current period, whereas B still owns iE −  points. Even 
though both workers have accumulated an additional unemployment pe-
riod at the end of the current period, the 'bifurcation' arises, because the 
unemployed A replaces a period of employment at the beginning of the 
current base period with the current unemployment period, so that his 
qualifying counter decreases by one; whereas B, on the other hand, re-
places an unemployment period at the beginning of the current base pe-
riod with the current unemployment period, so that his qualifying counter 
remains constant. Consequently, the expected waiting time of A is at least 
one period longer than the waiting time of B.  
An investor offering a vacancy knows just as little ex ante about the appli-
cants specific employment careers as about their accumulated qualifying 
points or their residual benefit claims. Yet the ex post value of the job 
and, consequently, his decision to offer a vacancy depends on these vari-
ables and on his expectations concerning these characteristics of an appli-
cant. In order to provide a simple model of the investor’s decision, we in-
troduce assumption (A5) below, which assures that the initial value of a 
filled job, jiTE −−Π , will indeed only depend on the characteristics 
[ ]jTiE −− ,  of the applicant and not on the distribution of the iE −  em-
                                                
2 In total, there are ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ − iEF  employment careers with iE −  qualifying points in the base 
period F, Ei ,,0 K= . If, for example, – as in Germany – the base period comprises 
24=F  months and the qualifying period 12=E  months, then there are ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛EF
610*7,2=  
possible employment careers with a completed qualifying period. 
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ployment periods over the base period F. The risk-neutral investor then 
needs only to estimate the probability jiTE −−μ  of meeting a type 
[ ]jTiE −− ,  applicant. 
We model the effect of the applicants employment careers and the above 
mentioned bifurcation on the decision of the investors to offer vacancies 
using the following Markov process. Let jiTEu −−  denote the pool of job 
seekers with iE −  qualifying points and jT −  residual benefit periods. 
(A5) [Employment Career]. The unemployed from jiTEu −− , who have 
found no job, make either a transition into the pool ( )1+−− jiTEu  (like the job 
seeker B in the above example) or into the pool ( ) ( )11 +−+− jTiEu  (like the job 
seeker A in the above example), where the first transition occurs with the 
probability [ )1,0∈γ  and the second with the probability ( ]1,01 ∈− γ . 
At the micro level, there exists no correlate of the transition probability γ. 
At the macro level in contrast, the policy parameter γ has quite the same 
effect as the distribution of the employment periods iE −  over the base 
period F. First, if EF = , this case corresponds to a transition probability of 
0=γ , as there is only one employment career which meets the qualifica-
tion requirement. In the second case EF > . The longer the base period F 
ceteris paribus the higher is the fraction of agents in the inflow to the ag-
gregate pool of unemployed u, who can claim UB. An increase in the tran-
sition probability γ has obviously the same effect on the mix of types in 
the inflow to u as an extension of the base period F. The reason is that on 
the macro level, γ determines the fraction of the job seekers from the ag-
gregate pool ≡− iEu  ∑ = −−Tj jiTEu1 , Ei ,,0 K= , whose qualifying counters do 
not decrease despite the advancing calendar time and who therefore 
search for a job in the following period with iE −  qualifying points again.3 
On the other hand, for the fraction γ−1  of the unemployed from pool 
                                                
3 The effects of the parameters of the labour market policy [ ]bTE ,,,γ  on the equilibrium 
unemployment rate u do not depend on whether the qualifying period E is shorter or 
longer than the benefit duration T. For the sake of brevity, we present the model 
equations for the case TE ≤ , which most of the OECD (2004) countries follow. The 
simulations and results in Section 4 of the paper, however, also take into account the 
case 1+≥ TE . 
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iEu − , both the counter of the residual claims and the qualifying counter 
decrease by one and their reservation income reduces correspondingly. 
Third – just as in the case ∞→F  –, if 1→γ , the fraction of the employed 
workers with a completed qualifying period approaches unity irrespective 
of the length of the qualifying period E. 
3.3 Qualifying Path and the Equilibrium Rate of Unem-
ployment 
The unemployment insurance [ ]bTE ,,,γ  with qualifying period E, base pe-
riod γ and benefit duration T creates a discrete distribution of E  types 
among the pool of employed workers: Employed workers differ in the 
qualifying counter iE − , 1,,0 −= Ei K . In the following, iEe −  denotes the 
pool of workers with iE −  qualifying points. Among the u unemployed, the 
unemployment insurance likewise creates a discrete distribution of types, 
who differ with respect to the qualifying points iE − , where 
1,,0 −= Ei K , and the residual benefit duration jT − , where Tij ,,K=  
by assumption (A5) and ET ≥ .4 
Since the time of the model is discrete, every employed worker owns at 
least one qualifying point. Job seekers from the pool ∑ = −= T Ej jTuu 00 , who 
do not possess qualifying points, begin their employment career in the 
pool 1e  and make a transition to the pool 2e , if 2Rx ≥  at the end of the 
first period of the current employment spell.5 2R  is the reservation pro-
ductivity for the transition from the pool 1e  to pool 2e , see Figure 1. Con-
sider a filled job with iE − , 1,,1 −= Ei K , qualifying points. At the end of 
the period the firm has to decide whether to continue the job or not. 
Given [ ]1,α∈x , the match is continued if ( )1−−≥ iERx  and the worker makes 
                                                
4 If TE ≤ , there are ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 2111E11 +−++=∑ +−+= EETkETEk  types of job seeker; if 1+≥ TE , 
the number of job seeker types amounts to ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )12110 +++=−+∑ −+= ETTTEkTTk . The 
steady state equations for the employees iEe −  and job seekers jiTEu −−  are developed 
further in Appendix IV. 
5 Whether the creation of vacancies is profitable depends in particular on the reserva-
tion productivity 1R . For profitability 11 ≤R  is a necessary condition because the firms 
choose the initial productivity at 1=x . 
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a transition to the pool ( )1−− iEe . Otherwise the match dissolves, the job be-
comes vacant and the worker unemployed – without claim to UB. Match 
partners from the pool 1−Ee  close to the completion of the qualifying pe-
riod decide to continue and make a transition to pool Ee , if ERx ≥ . The 
pool Ee  comprises exclusively jobs with a completed qualifying period. A 
job from Ee  is continued, if 1+≥ ERx . Otherwise, it is destroyed, and the 
worker becomes unemployed - with claim to UB. 1+ER  is the reservation 
productivity of the jobs with a completed qualifying period. 
We call the path of the reservation productivities [ ]EE RR ,,2 K=Ψ , 2≥E , 
the qualifying path: Every worker must – possibly interrupted by unem-
ployment spells – pass through the qualifying path EΨ  before his qualify-
ing period is completed and he is entitled to UB. 
Figure 1: Qualifying path 
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Out of the iEe −  employed workers with the qualifying counter iE − , 
( )( ) iEiE eRG −−− 1λ  lose their job at the end of the period. In the ensuing 
matching at the beginning of the following period, ( ) ( )( ) iEiE eRGp −−−− 11 λ  do 
not meet a vacancy and form the inflow to the pool of unemployed iEu − ; 
( ) ( )( )11 −−− iERGp λ  is the ex-post-incidence among the workers with the 
qualifying counter iE − . In the steady state, entries to the unemployment 
pool u are equal to exits, so that ( ) ( )( ) pueRGp Eii iEiE =− ∑ −== −−−10 11 λ . If we di-
vide both sides of the steady state condition by e and take into account 
that ue −= 1 , we obtain the equilibrium unemployment rate 
(22) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )θελθ
ελθ
Ψθ
pRGp
RGp
Ru
E
i
iEiE
E
i
iEiE
EE
+−
−
=
∑
∑
−
=
−−−
−
=
−−−
+ 1
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
,, , 
where ( )1,, +−− = EEiEiE RΨθεε , with ee iEiE −− =ε , 1,,0 −= Ei K , is the frac-
tion of the employed workers with the qualifying counter iE − , hence 
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1
1
0
=∑ −= −Ei iEε . As Lemma A3 in the Appendix IV shows, the shares iE −ε  and 
therefore the unemployment rate (22) are functions of the tightness of the 
labor market θ, the qualifying path [ ]EE RR ,,2 K=Ψ  and the reservation 
productivity 1+ER  of the jobs with a completed qualifying period. 
The equilibrium unemployment rate (22) – similarly to the steady state 
rate (4) of the unemployment insurance [ ]bT,  – depends on, first, the 
weighted average of the ex-post-incidences, ( )[ ] ( )( )∑ −= −−−− 10 11 Ei iEiERGp ελθ , 
and second, the duration of job search, ( )θp1 .  
3.4 Qualifying Rents and Waiting Time 
First, we deal with the asset equations of the filled jobs and the employed 
workers in the continuation periods of a match, then we focus on the job 
creation condition, the wage negotiation, the qualifying rents and finally 
the waiting time.6  
Continuation periods. The value of a filled job with a completed qualifying 
period is derived from the asset Equation (6) and the value of the worker 
from Equation (7). For convenience, we repeat the equations below. The 
market value of a filled job with a completed qualifying period is 
(23) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −++−= ∫
+
++++
1
1111
1
1
ER
EEEE xhdGhxwyxx ΠλΠλρΠ . 
The present value of a worker with a completed qualifying period is 
(24) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧ −+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ++= +++++ ∫
+
xWURGhdGhWxwxW E
R
ETEEEE
E
1
1
1111 1
1
λλρ , 
where [ ] ℜ→++ 1,: 11 EE Rw  is the function of the inside wage and ETU  is the 
value of a job seeker whose qualifying period and benefit entitlement are 
complete (see Equation (A8), Appendix III). Firm and worker with a com-
pleted qualifying period share the match rent according to the rule (14). 
                                                
6 The initial value of a newly filled job, the value of an outsider, who accepts a job, and 
the sharing rule that job seekers and vacancies use in their first contract negotiation 
as well as the asset equations for the value of the unemployed are developed in Ap-
pendix III. The asset equations (A6) and (A7) determine the initial values of the jobs 
and the workers, the value of the unemployed human capital is represented in the 
equation (A8). 
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The continuation value of a job with iE −  qualifying points, 1,,0 −= Ei K , 
and the productivity [ ]1,iERx −∈  is given by 
(25) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ){ }⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∫ −++−=
−−
−−−−−−
1
11
)1(
,0max1
iER
iEiEiEiE xhdGhxwyxx ΠλΠλρΠ . 
The firm chooses the reservation productivity ( )1−− iER , on which the transi-
tion to the pool ( )1−− iEe  depends. If the match is hit by a shock and draws 
the productivity ( )1−−≥ iERh , the match is continued, otherwise it is de-
stroyed. If no shock arrives, firm and worker must still decide whether to 
proceed. The reason is that if the match continues, the worker makes a 
transition to the pool ( )1−− iEe , so the value of the filled job in the continua-
tion period is ( ) ( )xiE 1−−Π . Since the profit maximizing firm is free to destroy 
the job at no charge, it decides for the alternative ( ) ( ){ }xiE 1,0max −−Π . The 
worker also prefers continuation only if ( ) ( ) 01 ≥−− xiEΠ , as is shown below. 
The value of a worker with the qualifying counter iE − , 1,,0 −= Ei K  is 
given by 
(26) 
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If the job is hit by a shock and draws ( )1−−< iERh , it is destroyed and the 
worker with the qualifying counter iE −  becomes unemployed. In the case 
0=i , the unemployed who is entitled to UB has the value ETU ; in the case 
1,,1 −= Ei K , the worker’s qualifying period is not yet completed and his 
value is 0iEU − . If no shock occurs, the worker chooses the alternative 
( ) ( ){ }xWU iEiE 10,max −−− . If ( ) ( ) 01 iEiE UxW −−− ≥  – or ( ) ETE UxW ≥+1 , in the case 
0=i  – he decides to continue the match, otherwise he leaves the firm 
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and makes a transition to the pool of unemployed. As the insiders share 
the rent of the job according to the rule 
(27) ( ) ( ) ( )xUxW iEiEiE −+−− −=− Πβ
β
101
, 1,,0 −= Ei K , 
( ) ( ) 01 iEiE UxW −−− ≥  applies if and only if ( ) ( ) 01 ≥−− xiEΠ . The sharing rule (27) 
takes into account that the worker ]0,[ iE −  makes a transition to ( )1−− iEe  if 
the wage negotiations succeed. If the bargaining fails, the worker be-
comes unemployed with a qualifying counter equal to iE −  without enti-
tlement to benefits. In this case his value is 0iEU − . 
Job creation. Out of the u job seekers, there are jiTEu −−  with iE −  qualify-
ing points and a current spell of unemployment of length j. Since all job 
seekers look for jobs with the same search intensity, for a given vacancy 
uu jiTEjiTE −−−− =μ  is the conditional probability of an application from a job 
seeker from jiTEu −− . The probabilities jiTE −−μ  – developed in Lemma A4, 
Appendix IV – are functions of the tightness θ, the base period γ, the 
qualifying path [ ]EE RR ,,2 K=Ψ  and the reservation productivity 1+ER  for 
jobs with a completed qualification. The expected market value of a newly 
filled job is ∑ −−−− jiTEjiTE Πμ . Access to the labor market is free, so that 
the following job creation condition applies in the steady state, given the 
search costs k and the probability q of an application: 
(28) ∑ ∑
= =
−−−−+−=
E
i
T
ij
jiTEjiTEqk
0
0 Πμ . 
The agents negotiate the following inside and outside wages. 
Lemma 4 [Bargained Wages]. (i) The bargained inside wage of a worker with 
a completed qualifying period at a match specific productivity [ ]1,α∈x  is 
(29) ( ) ( )ETETE rUyxrUxw −+=+ β1 . 
The inside wage of a worker with the counter iE −  and the job specific produc-
tivity [ ]1,α∈x  is: 
(30) 
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(ii) Since newly filled jobs produce with the productivity 1=x  a job seeker with 
the counter iE −  and a residual benefit duration of jT −  periods, Tij ,,K= , 
obtains the outside wage 
(31) 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )⎪⎩
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=−−+
=−−−
=
−
−−−−−
−
−+
−−
EiUUw
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,,1,11
0,11
1
01
1
1
Kρβ
ρβ
 
where ( )11+Ew  and ( ) ( )11−− iEw  are the inside-wages (29) and (30) for 1=x . 
The inside wage )(xw iE−  of a worker with the counter iE −  has – as (30) 
shows – three components: the reservation income, ( )01+− iErU , the worker’s 
share of the current match rent, ( ) ][ 01+−− iErUyxβ , and the side payment 
( ) ( ) ][1 010 +−− −− iEiE UUβ . To understand the reason for the side payment no-
tice that at the end of the current period, the worker has ( )1+− iE  quali-
fying points and the reservation value ( )01+− iEU . If the match is continued, 
the counter increases by one to iE −  and the reservation value of the 
human capital increases by the qualifying rent ( )010 +−− − iEiE UU . The firm, 
which employs the worker, appropriates the share β−1  of the qualifying 
rent. The qualifying rent is the result of institutional frictions, which 
emerge from the prevailing order of the labor law. In accordance with as-
sumption (A2), the qualifying period is an asset owned by the worker, 
which is not tradable. Thus, since the labor force is exogenous, a dissipa-
tion of the qualifying rent is generally excluded, even in the steady state.  
If one compares, ceteris paribus, two agents with a completed qualifying 
period ( 0=i ) – one is an outsider, the other an insider – then, as we 
would expect, the outsider is worse off, because, as opposed to the in-
sider, he has to pay a side payment, as seen in the first line of (31). The 
size of the payment is determined by the length j of the current spell of 
unemployment and the quasi-rent jETET UU −− , by which the reservation 
value of the outsider is lower than the reservation value of the insider. 
Now compare two agents with the counter iE −  who have not yet com-
pleted their qualifying period – where one is an outsider with a residual 
entitlement of jT −  periods, the other is an insider – then the outsider is 
better off, since he receives a wage bonus, which is dependent on the 
quasi-rent 0iEjiTE UU −−− − , as the second line of (31) shows. The insider is 
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worse off, because his qualifying period is not yet completed and, as a re-
sult, in accordance with assumptions (A1) and (A2), he has no benefit en-
titlement – as opposed to the outsider. 
As the following proposition shows, the market value of a filled job 
( ) ( )xiE 1−−Π , Ei ,,0 K= , is a continuously increasing function of [ ]1,α∈x . If 
( ) ( ) 01 ≤−− αΠ iE , as we assume throughout, a reservation productivity 
( )1−− iER  exists, which fulfils the reservation condition 
(32) ( ) ( )( ) 011 =−−−− iEiE RΠ , Ei ,,0 K= . 
The asset values of the filled jobs and the job destruction rules are dis-
cussed in the following proposition, which is proved in the Appendix III. 
Proposition (i) [Filled Jobs]. The value of a filled job with a completed qualify-
ing period and the idiosyncratic productivity [ ]1,1+∈ ERx , is 
(33) ( ) ( )
r
Rx
yx EE +
−−= ++ λβΠ
1
1 1 . 
Through backward induction, the continuity and monotonicity of ( )xE 1+Π  are 
transferred to ( )xiE−Π , as the Equation (34) shows. The value of a job from the 
pool iEe − , 1,,0 −= Ei K , is 
(34) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }[ ]{ }.,0max,0max11 11 iEiEiEiEiE RxRxyx −−−−−−− −−+−−= ΠΠλβρΠ  
 
(ii) [Job Destruction]. For a job with a completed qualifying period, the job 
destruction rule can be derived by evaluating the asset Equation (23) at the res-
ervation threshold 1+= ERx . Taking into account the wage Equation (29) we ob-
tain: 
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. 
For a job with the qualifying counter iE − , the job destruction rule can be de-
rived from the asset Equation (25), the reservation condition (32) and the wage 
Equation (30) with 
(36) 
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As the Equations (35) and (36) show, the current reservation output of a 
match is lower than the match’s permanent reservation income both dur-
ing the waiting time of the worker, see Equations (36), and also after the 
completion of the qualifying period, see Equation (35). The reservation 
income of a match – given the assumption of free disposal and the infi-
nitely elastic supply of vacancies – is identical with the reservation income 
of the worker. 
With the job termination rule (35), the firm chooses the reservation pro-
ductivity 1+ER  such that ETE rUyR <+1  for the reservation output of the 
match. The firms are willing to hoard labor, even if hit by severe demand 
shocks. The reasons for this behavior are the search costs and the result-
ing option value of a filled job. The option value is the expected market 
value of a productive job weighted with the shock probability λ. If demand 
changes in favor of the job, the hoarded workers are immediately ready to 
start production, since neither search nor recruiting costs arise on the ‘in-
ternal labor market’. If the match partners would separate as soon as the 
output falls below the reservation income of the match, they would sacri-
fice this option and have to search for another match. 
The waiting time is the time that passes until a worker on the qualifying 
path becomes eligible to UB. Under the conditions of the unemployment 
insurance [ ]bTE ,,,γ , the waiting time is endogenous, whereby workers 
face the following trade-off. 
The shock parameter [ ]1,α∈x  is bounded from below. Consequently, a 
match can force the continuation of production until the UI entitlement is 
reached. Thus, for example, a worker with the qualifying counter iE −  can 
reduce his waiting time to exactly i periods, if the firm fixes the reserva-
tion productivity along the residual qualifying path at the level of the lower 
support α. By taking this decision, however, the worker must accept a 
low, possibly negative wage, what pays only if he can expect a high UB b, 
a long benefit duration T or a low utility of leisure z. 
The worker will weigh the disadvantages of restraining his wage claims 
against the benefit from a reduction in the waiting time. His willingness to 
restrain his wage claims during the waiting time – as the job destruction 
rule (36) shows – is bounded by the path of the reservation incomes, the 
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qualifying rents he can expect to capture and the option value of the filled 
job. 
The option value of the filled job is measured by the integral expression in 
Equation (36). Since the worker makes a transition independent of the 
prevailing market conditions from iEe −  to ( )1−− iEe  when the job is contin-
ued, the lower bound of the integral is the reservation productivity ( )1−− iER  
that is the threshold productivity for the transition to ( )1−− iEe . 
If the firm currently produces at the break-even point with the reservation 
productivity iER −  and is not hit by a shock – an event which has the prob-
ability λ−1  – the firm opts for the alternative ( ) ( ){ }iEiE R −−− 1,0max Π  as a 
consequence of the free disposal. 
Finally, the worker’s willingness to accept a sequence of low wages on the 
qualifying path is bounded by the qualifying rents. If the firm chooses the 
reservation productivity iER − , it takes the worker’s reservation value 
( )01+− iEU  into account. If the match is continued, the reservation value of 
the worker increases to 0iEU − . In order to capture the qualifying rent 
( )010 +−− − iEiE UU  created by the insurance system, the worker is willing to 
accept a reduction of the reservation output of the match by an amount 
just equal to the rent. 
3.5 Solution 
To solve the model, we must determine the equilibrium path of the reser-
vation productivities ( )1−− iER , Ei ,,0 K= , and the steady state tightness θ 
of the labor market – in total 2+E  variables. The reservation productiv-
ities depend on the reservation wages of the workers, the qualifying rents 
and the market values of the filled jobs, as the job destruction rules (35) 
and (36) show. The market values of the filled jobs are in turn functions of 
the reservation productivities, as Equations (33) and (34) show. In order 
to close the model, Lemma A6 in Appendix IV makes clear how both the 
reservation wages of the workers and the qualifying rents depend on the 
market values of the filled jobs and, thus, the reservation productivities. 
To calculate the tightness θ, we need the job creation condition (28). The 
conditional probabilities jiTE −−μ  of meeting a job seeker with the qualifying 
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counter iE −  and a residual benefit duration of jT −  periods are devel-
oped in Lemma A4 in Appendix IV.  
4 Simulation 
Parameters and matching function. The base line parameters for the nu-
meric simulations are shown in Table 2. The bargaining power of the 
workers is 50.0=β , the output of a job at full productivity is 100=y . 
The value of leisure is 30=z , UB are 30=b . The real interest rate r is 
2 %; the probability of a productivity shock λ is 10 %; the search and re-
cruiting costs of a vacancy amount to 30=k . The distribution function 
( )xG  of the productivity shocks is assumed to be uniform on [ ]1,α , with the 
lower support 0=α . If we replace the uniform distribution by a beta dis-
tribution with varying parameter values we receive for all simulations 
similar results. The matching function of the search market is of the Cobb-
Douglas type (Petrongolo/Pissarides 2001). For a given vacancy, the 
probability of a contact with a job seeker is ( ) =θq ( )φδθ −− 1 . For the elasticity 
of the job matches with respect to the supply of vacancies, we use 
50.0=φ  and for the ‘total factor productivity’ we assume 60.0=δ .  
Table 2: The baseline parameter of the model 
β r λ y z b k α φ δ 
0.50 0.02 0.10 100 30 30 30 0 0.50 0.60 
 
The results of the simulations with the qualifying period E, the benefit du-
ration T and the base period γ are shown in Appendix I. Figures 2-4 pro-
vide simulations with the benefit duration T and the qualifying period E for 
a given base period 10.0=γ . For the qualifying period, we assume 
8,4=E  and for the benefit duration 20,,2,1 K=T . In addition, Appen-
dix I compares the two unemployment insurance systems [ ]bTE ,,,γ  and 
[ ]bT,  (see Section 2). With the unemployment insurance [ ]bT, , every em-
ployed worker is entitled to up to T payments of the UB b. The model of 
the unemployment insurance [ ]bT, , therefore, implicitly assumes that for 
the qualifying period 1=E  and the base period 1=γ . Figures 5a-c deal 
with comparative static simulations with the base period γ for a benefit 
duration of 10=T  periods and the qualifying periods 8,4=E . 
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Result 1 [Decreasing Qualifying Path [ ]EE RR ,,2 K=Ψ ]. Figure 2a, Appen-
dix I, shows the qualifying paths EΨ  for 4=E  and 8=E , a benefit dura-
tion of 10=T  periods and a base period 10.0=γ . The counter of the 
qualifying period, 1,,1 += Ei K , is depicted on the horizontal axis and the 
corresponding reservation productivities are graphed on the vertical axis. 
For example, figure 2b pictures, for the case 4=E , the four reservation 
productivities of the qualifying path 4Ψ  and the reservation productivity 
1+ER  of the jobs with a completed qualifying period, against the benefit du-
ration T on the horizontal axis.  
As Figure 2a and 2b demonstrate, the qualifying path EΨ  follows the same 
pattern in all simulations: First, the qualifying paths are concave and to 
reap the qualifying rents firms reduce the reservation productivities 
( )1−− iER , Ei ,,0 K= , until they reach a minimum in the last period before 
the completion of the qualifying period. Second, as soon as firm and 
worker have captured all rents and the worker is entitled to the UB, the 
reservation productivity, the quit rate and the wage of the employed 
worker jump to the levels of the jobs with a completed qualifying period, 
such that α≥>>>>+ EE RRRR K211 . If we draw a vertical line through 
Figure 2b at 10=T , we obtain the qualifying path 4Ψ  for 4=E , which is 
shown in Figure 2a.  
Result 2 [Benefit Duration T]. The benefit duration T affects u via two 
channels: First, through the weighted ex-post-incidence, In-
exP ( ) ( )( )∑ −== −−−−≡ 10 11 Eii iEiERGp ελ , and second, through the expected unem-
ployment duration pD 1= . In-exP, the weighted ex-post-incidence, is the 
fraction of the employed workers who lose their job, do not find a follow-
up job at the subsequent matching and, as a result, are unemployed for at 
least one period.  
Consider, for example, the insurance system with the qualifying period 
4=E . If the policymakers increase the benefit duration from 1=T  to 
20=T , the expected duration of unemployment increases from 84.1=D  
periods to 17.2=D  periods, see Figure 3a, while the ex-post-incidence 
grows from 4.1 % to 4.8 %, see Figure 3b. For a given qualifying period E 
therefore, the unemployment rate u strictly increases with the benefit du-
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ration T, see Figure 3c. For 4=E , for example, the equilibrium rate of un-
employment increases from 7 % to 9.5 %, if the benefit duration rises 
from 1=T  to 20=T . 
Result 3 [Qualifying Period E]. An extension of the qualifying period E for 
a given base period ( 10.0=γ ) lowers the unemployment rate, as Figure 
3c and Figure 4 make clear.  
The unemployment rate strictly decreases with an increasing E, since, ce-
teris paribus, both the unemployment duration and the weighted ex-post-
incidence decrease with the rising E, see Figure 3a and Figure 3b. For ex-
ample, with 10.0=γ  and 10=T  the unemployment rate falls from 
74.9=u  % to 13.9=u  %, if the qualifying period E increases from 1 to 
10 calendar periods. 
Result 4 [Comparison Between the Insurance Systems]. The insurance 
system [ ]bT,  implicitly sets 1=E  and 1=γ , such that u is strictly higher 
than in the insurance systems with qualifying periods 2≥E , see the dot-
ted lines in the Figures 3a-c. The reasons for the increasing difference be-
tween the equilibrium rates of unemployment of the two insurance sys-
tems are, that under the conditions of the insurance [ ]bTE ,,,γ  not only is 
the average duration of unemployment shorter than in the system [ ]bT,  
but the ex-post-incidence is also lower. What are the reasons for this or-
dering? 
The risk-neutral match partners have rational expectations and anticipate 
the consequences of job destruction. In the insurance system [ ]bTE ,,,γ , 
the destruction of a job that qualifies for UB occurs with the endogenous 
probability ( )1+ERGλ , whereas in the system [ ]bT,  the probability is ( )RGλ , 
where ( ) ( )1+> ERGRG λλ . In fact, the workers in both insurance systems are 
entitled to the UB b and an equally long benefit duration of T periods. Fur-
thermore, in both insurance systems, they have a positive probability of 
losing their benefit entitlement and to become long term unemployed. Yet 
with the unemployment insurance [ ]bT, , they can be sure of having the 
benefit entitlement regained with their next job. Moreover, the waiting 
time, which elapses until a worker who loses his current job receives the 
next benefit entitlement, is under [ ]bT,  identical with the duration of job 
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search, which is equal to p/1 . In the insurance system [ ]bTE ,,,γ , on the 
other hand, a positive probability exists that the worker with an increasing 
duration of unemployment will not only lose his benefit entitlement, but 
also his qualifying points, so that, on average, ceteris paribus more time 
will pass until the completion of the next qualifying period than just the 
time of the job search, which is the lower bound for the waiting time. 
While the waiting time which elapses between two benefit entitlements in 
the system [ ]bT,  is exogenous for the individual match and identical with 
the expected duration of job search, p/1 , from the perspective of the job 
seeker, the waiting time in the insurance system [ ]bTE ,,,γ  is endogenous 
and bounded from below by the expected duration of an unemployment 
spell. As a consequence, the reservation wage of a worker entitled to UB 
is, ceteris paribus, lower in the insurance system [ ]bTE ,,,γ  than in the 
unemployment insurance [ ]bT, , his wage income is also lower and his will-
ingness to continue the match despite adverse demand shocks is higher. 
Result 5 [Base Period and Convergence]. Figure 5a-c illustrate the im-
pact of the base period γ on the (weighted) ex-post-incidence, see Figure 
5a, the unemployment duration, see Figure 5b, and the equilibrium un-
employment rate, see Figure 5c. Just for comparison, the figures show the 
corresponding graphs for the unemployment insurance [ ]bT, . 
As Figure 5c shows, the equilibrium rate of unemployment strictly in-
creases with the base period γ. An increase in γ does not only lower the 
waiting time, but also the qualifying rents and therefore the option value 
of a filled job. Moreover, the expected wage income increases, the supply 
of vacancies falls and, as a result, both the duration of unemployment, 
see Figure 5b, and the weighted ex-post-incidence, see Figure 5a, in-
crease. 
In addition, Figure 5a–c illustrate that the equilibrium values of the ex-
post incidence, the unemployment duration and hence the unemployment 
rate in the class of insurance systems [ ]bTE ,,,γ  with 2≥E , converge with 
rising γ from below to the corresponding values of the insurance [ ]bT, . 
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Result 6 [Iso-Unemployment Curve 5.9=u  %]. The insurance system 
[ ]bTE ,,,γ  consists of four policy parameters. The ‘iso-unemployment 
curves’ in the policy space are therefore four-dimensional hyperplanes. 
Figures 6a-c depict three-dimensional ),,( TEγ -sectors of the iso-unemp-
loyment curve for 5.9=u  %. Figure 6b illustrates the ),,( TEγ -plane for 
an UB of 30=b , while Figures 6a and 6c show the corresponding 
),,( TEγ -planes for a 5 % reduction of the UB to 5.28=b  and a 5 % in-
crease of the UB to 5.31=b  respectively. 
Figures 7a-c and 8a-c graph two-dimensional sectors of the iso-
unemployment curve 5.9=u  %. Figure 7a shows the negative trade-off 
between the UB b and the benefit duration T for the base periods 10.0=γ  
and 60.0=γ , where 4=E ; for 10=T  Figure 7b depicts the positive 
trade-off between the UB b and the qualifying period E, where for the 
base periods 10.0=γ , 30.0=γ  and 60.0=γ ; Figure 7c shows the posi-
tive trade-off between the benefit duration T and the qualifying period E 
for the base periods 10.0=γ  and 30.0=γ . Figures 8a-c depict the base 
period γ on the vertical axis and the UB b, the benefit duration T and the 
qualifying period E on the horizontal axes. Figure 8a shows the negative 
trade-off between the UB b and the length of the base period γ; Figure 8b 
graphs the negative trade-off between the benefit duration T and the base 
period γ; and Figure 8c finally shows the positive trade-off between the 
base period γ and the qualifying period E. 
5 Conclusion 
Base period and qualifying period are instruments of the labor market pol-
icy, which have so far received little attention in labor market theory, 
macroeconomic theory and empirical research. We develop a Mortensen-
Pissarides type search model, in which we integrate the following policy 
instruments: The base period, the qualifying period, the unemployment 
benefit and a finite benefit duration. A worker is entitled to UB, if he has 
completed the statutory qualifying period within the base period. 
The qualifying period lowers both the incidence and the duration of unem-
ployment and therefore reduces the aggregate unemployment rate. On 
the other hand, an increasing base period weakens the effect of the quali-
IABDiscussionPaper No. 10/2006   
 
33
fying period by providing workers with a time margin to meet the criterion 
of the qualifying rule. The longer the base period, the higher therefore the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment. 
In an unemployment insurance system without qualifying rule – as for ex-
ample in the standard MP-model – the time that passes until the benefit 
entitlement occurs is exogenous. Every worker, who makes a transition to 
unemployment, is entitled to UB and every job seeker must wait until he 
finds a new job and in turn the next benefit entitlement. The qualifying 
period endogenizes the waiting time and confronts the workers with the 
following trade-off. The lower the separation rates negotiated by the 
match, the longer the durability of the job, the shorter the waiting time, 
but also the lower the worker’s wage. The decision to reduce the waiting 
time is more attractive the higher the UB are, the longer the benefit dura-
tion and the lower the utility of leisure. The price for a prolongation of the 
durability of the job and a shorter waiting time is the wage penalty, which 
the worker must accept, if the match is hit by adverse productivity or de-
mand shocks. 
For a match on the qualifying path, the separation rate falls from period to 
period, until it reaches a minimum in the last time period before the com-
pletion of the qualifying criterion. At this point, the qualifying rents cre-
ated by the unemployment insurance are skimmed off, and the reserva-
tion productivity and with it the separation rate and the wage of the work-
ers, who are now entitled to UB, increase sharply.  
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Appendix II 
Proof of Lemma 1. (i): From (14), it follows that   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xxWUT Πβββ −−=− 11 . Solve the asset Equations (6) and (7) with 
respect to )(xΠ  and )(xW , insert the solutions into the above equation 
and rearrange terms to get the inside wage (16). 
 
(ii) From (15), it follows that ( ) ( ) jTjTjT WU −−− −−=− Πβββ 11 . Inserting (8) 
and (9) into the last equation gives  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]1[]111[1 wwWU jTjT −+−−=− −− ρΠβββ , from which in view of 
(14) the outside wage (17) follows. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) and (ii): From (5) and (6) we have   
( ) ( ) ( )∫+−= 10 R hdGhRwyR Πλ . From this equation, taking (16) and (6) into 
account we obtain the Equations (18) and (19).  
 
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) From (13), (15), (8) and the wage Equation (17), it 
follows that  
(A1) ( )][ 1+−− +++= jTjT UbzdDU . 
where ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]TUppD βΠββ β −+−−−≡ 11111  and ( )( )ppd βρ−− −≡ 11 1 . Solving 
the difference Equation (A1) gives: 
(A2) =− jTU ( )[ ] 011 UdbzdDdd jT
jT
−
−
+++−
−
. 
In the same way, it follows from (12), (15), (8) and (17) for 0U :  
(A3) 
( )
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) Dprp pzprppU βρ ββρβ ρ +− −−++−− −= 1 1111 10 . 
Using (A3) in (A2) gives: 
(A4) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]TjTjT Uprppdbzprp pU βΠβρβ ββρ ρ −++−−+−++− −= −− 111111 1 . 
From (A4) we obtain the asset Equation (20). 
(ii) The Equation (21) follows directly from (8) and (17). 
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Appendix III 
The sharing rule for wage negotiations between a vacancy and a job 
seeker is given by 
(A5) jiTEjiTEjiTE UW −−−−−− −=− Πβ
β
1
, Ei ,,0 K= , Tij ,,K= , 
where jiTEW −−  is the value of a entrant with iE −  qualifying points and a 
residual benefit duration of jT −  periods, jiTEU −−  is the value of the un-
employed outsider, and jiTE −−Π  is the initial value of a job occupied by an 
entrant with the characteristics ],[ jTiE −− . jiTE −−Π  depends on the job 
seeker’s residual claims and the current status of the qualifying counter, 
where in view of the initial productivity 1=x , the outside wage jiTEw −−  
and the asset Equations (23) and (25): 
(A6) 
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For the distribution of the initial values of the job seekers, jiTEW −− , analo-
gously we have: 
(A7) 
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Finally, the distribution of the steady state values of the job seekers is 
given by: 
(A8) 
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In (A8) z is the utility of leisure, b the UB and [ )1,0∈γ  the length of the 
base period. If the job seeker does not meet a vacancy, his current spell 
of unemployment increases from length j to 1+j , while the counter of the 
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qualifying period is constant with probability 1<γ  and decreases from 
iE −  to ( )1+− iE  by one point with probability 01 >− γ .7 
Proof of Lemma 4. (i) From the sharing rule (14), it follows that:   ( ) ( ) −− + xWE 11 β ( ) =+ xE 1Πβ  ( ) ETUβ−1 . Using the asset Equations (23) – (24) 
and rearranging terms provides the wage Equation (29). For convenience, 
we repeat the equation below: 
(A9) ( ) ( )ETETE rUyxrUxw −+=+ β1 . 
From the sharing rule (27), it follows that:   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0111 +−−− −=−− iEiEiE UxxW βΠββ , 1,,0 −= Ei K . If we use the asset 
Equation (25) and assume 0=i , then by virtue of the first line of (26) and 
(A9), we obtain the first line of the wage Equation (A10) below. The other 
wage equations of (A10) for 1,,1 −= Ei K  result analogously: 
(A10) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎨
⎧
−=−−
+−−−
=−−+−−−
=−−−
=
−−−
−
+−−−−
−
−
−−
−
−+
−
1,,2,1
1
1,11
0,1
001
1
0101
10
1
2010
1
101
EiUU
UUxw
iUUUUxw
iUUxw
xw
iEiE
iEiEiE
EETEEE
EETE
iE
Kβ
ρβ
βρβ
ρβ
 
The wage Equation (30) is developed in the following way. For 0=i , we 
get from (A10): ( ) =xwE ( ) ( ) ( )1011 1 −−+ −−− EETE UUxw ρβ . If we replace ( )xwE 1+  using (A9), we get in view of r+=− 11ρ  the first line of (30):   ( ) ( ) =−−−−+= −− 1011)()( EETETETE UUrUyxrUxw ρββ  
−+− yxrUET ββ)1( ( ) ( ) =−− −− 1011 EET UUρβ −−+ −− )( 1010 EE rUyxrU β( ) −− ETU(1 β )UE 10− . Now we assume that the wage Equation (30) holds for 
( ) ( )xw iE 1−− . Then for ( )xw iE− , we obtain with (A10):   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) +−−−= −+−−−−− 10101 1 ρβ iEiEiEiE UUxwxw ( ) ( )( )0011 iEiE UU −−− −− β . If we 
replace ( ) ( )xw iE 1−−  using (30) and rearrange, we obtain the wage equation 
for iE − . 
 
(ii) Rewrite the sharing rule (A5): ( ) ( ) jiTEjiTEjiTE UW −−−−−− −=−− βΠββ 11 , 
and insert the asset Equations (A6) and (A7) to obtain the wage Equations 
(31). 
 
                                                
7 The job seeker – like B in the introductory example – was unemployed F periods ago 
and in the second case – like A in the introductory example - he was employed F peri-
ods ago. 
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Proof of the Proposition. (i) If we solve the asset Equation (23) for ( )xE 1+Π  
and take the wage Equation (29) into account, we obtain:  
(A11) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }∫ + ++ +−−−+= 1 11 1111 ER EETE hdGhrUyxrx ΠλββλΠ . 
Let 1+= ERx  in (A11) then by virtue of ( ) 011 =++ EE RΠ , we obtain the asset 
Equation (33). If we use the wage Equation (30) in (25), we obtain, for 
1,,2 −= Ei K :  
(A12) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎩⎨
⎧ +−−+−−−= +−−+−− ][111 01001 iEiEiEiE UUrUyxx βββρΠ  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }( ) ⎭⎬
⎫−+∫ −− −−−−1 111 ,0max1iER iEiE xhdGh ΠλΠλ . 
If we use iERx −=  in (A12) and consider the reservation condition (32), we 
obtain the continuation value (34). 
 
(ii) If we use 1+= ERx  in (A11) and solve the equation for 1+ER , consider-
ing the reservation condition (32), we get the job-destruction rule (35). 
Correspondingly, if we use iERx −=  in (A12) and solve for the reservation 
productivity iER − , we get the job-destruction-rule (36).  
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Appendix IV 
A. Pool equations 
First we deal with the steady equations for the number of employed work-
ers, iEe − , ,,0 K=i  1−E , then we develop the steady state conditions for 
the job seekers, jiTEu −− , Ei ,,0 K= , Tij ,,K= . The effects of the parame-
ters of the labour market policy [ ]bTE ,,, γ  on the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate u do not depend on whether the qualifying period E is shorter or 
longer than the benefit duration T. For the sake of brevity, we represent 
the pool equations and the proofs for the case TE ≤ . The simulations and 
results, Section 4, also take into account the case 1+≥ TE . 
1. Employed Workers 
In the steady state, the following equations hold for the number of the 
employed workers with the qualifying counter iE −  and 1,,0 −= Ei K : 
(A13) 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]
( )
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎨
⎧
−=
−=
++−
=+
+−++−
=
∑
∑
∑ ∑
−
=
+−
+=
−+−
+−−+−−
= =
−−−
−++
−
1,
2,,1,
1
0,
11
0
0
1
1
11
1
0
1
111
Eiup
Eiup
eRGpeRG
iupeRGp
eRGeRGpeRG
e
ET
j
jET
T
ij
jTiE
iEiEiEiE
m
T
mj
jmTEEE
EEEEEE
iE
K
λλ
λ
λλλ
 
Ad 0=i : Ee  is the measure of the employed workers with a completed 
qualifying period. The inflow of Ee  consists first of workers with a produc-
tive job who are entitled to UB, ( )[ ] EE eRG 11 +− λ ; second, workers entitled 
to UB who made a job-to-job transition belong to the inflow, ( ) EE eRGp 1+λ ; 
third, in the inflow are the workers of the pool 1−Ee  who make a transition 
to Ee , ( )[ ] 11 −− EE eRGλ , or who made a job-to-job transition to Ee , 
( ) 1−EE eRGpλ ; and fourth, the successful job seekers ∑
=
−
1
0m
mEup , where 
∑
=
−−− ≡
T
mj
jmTEmE uu , with a qualifying counter equal to E or 1−E  belong 
also to the inflow of Ee . 
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Ad 1−= Ei : The inflow of the pool 1e  consists of successful job seekers 
whose qualifying counter is equal to zero because of the long unemploy-
ment, 0pu , where ( )∑−
=
+−≡
ET
j
jETuu
0
00 . 
2. Job Seekers 
2.1 For the measure of job seekers with a completed qualifying period and 
a current spell of unemployment of length j, jETu − , the following holds in 
the steady state 
(A14) 
( )
( ) ( )
( )( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=+−
−=−
=−
= −−
+
−
Tjuup
Tjup
jeRGp
u
EE
jET
EE
jET
,1
1,,1,1
0,)(1
10
1
1
γ
γ
λ
K . 
Ad 0=j : ETu  is the pool of the unemployed with a completed qualifying 
period and full entitlement to UB. The inflow to ETu  consists of workers 
with a completed qualifying period who lost their job in the previous pe-
riod and did not meet a vacancy during the last matching. 
Ad Tj = : The third line of (A14) shows the inflow to the pool of job seek-
ers with a completed qualifying period, but no residual claims to unem-
ployment insurance, 0Eu . The inflow consists of job seekers from the pool 
10 EE uu +  who, although without a match, retain their qualifying points, an 
event, which has the probability ( )p−1γ . 
2.2 For the pool of job seekers with a current spell of unemployment of 
length j and a qualifying counter equal to iE − , jiTEu −− , the following 
steady state condition holds 
(A15) 
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )( ) ( )[
( ) ( ) ( )( )]⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎨
⎧
=−=+−
+++−
−+=−=−+−
=−=−−
=
−−−−
−−−−−
−−−−−−−
−−−−
−−
TjEiuu
uueRGp
TijEiuup
ijEiup
u
iEiE
iEiEiEiE
jTiEjiTE
jTiE
jiTE
,1,,1,1
1
1,,1,1,,1,11
,1,,1,11
1101
101
111
11
K
KK
K
γ
γλ
γγ
γ
 
Ad ijEi =−= ,1,,1 K : Since ij ≥ , iiTEu −−  is the pool of job seekers which 
has the shortest current spell of unemployment of ij =  periods given the 
qualifying counter iE − . As the first line of (A15) illustrates, the inflow to 
iiTEu −−  consists of unsuccessful job seekers who still belonged to the pool 
( ) ( )11 −−−− jTiEu  in the previous period.8 
                                                
8 In view of base period F, this transition corresponds to the transition of a job seeker 
with the qualifying counter ( )1−− iE  who did not meet a vacancy and was employed F 
periods ago. 
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Ad TjEi =−= ,1,,1 K : The inflow to the pool 0iEu −  is first composed of 
workers who lost their job because of an adverse shock and did not meet 
a vacancy during the subsequent matching, ( ) ( ) iEiE eRGp −−−− )(1 1λ . Sec-
ondly, the fraction of the unsuccessful job seekers from pool 10 iEiE uu −− +  
makes a transition to 0iEu −  who retain their qualifying points.
9 Finally the 
fraction of unsuccessful job seekers from the pool ( ) ( )1101 −−−− + iEiE uu  who 
lose a qualifying point belong also to the inflow to 0iEu − . 
2.3 For job seekers with a current spell of unemployment of length Ej ≥ , 
whose qualifying counter is equal to zero, jTu −0 , the following steady state 
conditions hold 
(A16) 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )( )[ ]⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
=+−++−
−+=−+−
=−−
= −−−−
−−
−
Tjuuuup
TEjuup
Ejup
u jTjT
ET
jT
,11
1,,1,11
,11
11100100
1110
11
0
γ
γ
γ
K  
Ad Tj = : The pool 00u  consists of job seekers who have neither qualifying 
points nor residual claims for unemployment insurance. The inflow to 00u  
is composed of unsuccessful job seekers first from pool 0100 uu +  and sec-
ond from pool 1110 uu +  who lose the last qualifying point at the transition. 
B. Conditional Probabilities uu jiTEjiTE −−−− =μ  (Lemmas A1 – A5) 
Next we present the Lemmas A1 – A4, to be used to develop the func-
tional forms of the above pool equations and the fractions ( )1,, +− EEiE RΨθε . 
Lemma A4 derives the conditional probabilities jiTE −−μ  to meet a job 
seeker with characteristics ],[ jTiE −−  from the solutions of the pool 
equations. 
1. Lemmas A1 – A4 
Lemma A1 presents solutions of the difference Equations (A14) – (A16) 
for the different types of job seekers. To solve the equations, we use the 
conditional probability ( ) ≡θa ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( ) ( )[ ]θγθ θγ pp p−−+ −− 11 11 , which depends on the 
tightness θ. A job seeker with qualifying counter iE −  makes a transition 
from his type-specific pool ∑ = −−− ≡ T ij jiTEiE uu  either because his search was 
successful or because he did not meet a vacancy and loses a qualifying 
point. The first event occurs with the probability p, the second with the 
probability ( )( )p−− 11 γ . a is the probability that a job seeker who makes a 
                                                
9 These workers were unemployed F periods ago. 
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transition will not find a job and loses a qualifying point. a−1  is the prob-
ability that a job seeker who makes a transition will find a new job. 
Lemma A1 (i) [Job Seekers]. 1. For the job seeker pool jiTEu −− , with 
1,,0 −= Ei K  and 1,, −= Tij K , the following is true: 
(A17) ( ) ( ) ( ) EEijjijiTE eRGpi
j
u 1
111 +
−+
−− −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= λγγ . 
2. For the job seeker pool 0iEu − , with 1,,1 −= Ei K , we have:  
(A18) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎢⎣
⎡ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−−−
−= ∑
=
−−
+−
i
k
kTkki
EE
T
iE ak
T
eRGp
p
p
u
0
10 1111
1 γγλγ ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤∑
=
−−−
−i
k
kEkE
ki eRGa
1
1λ . 
3. For the pool 0Eu  we can prove: 
(A19) ( ) ( ) ( ) EETTE eRGpp
p
u 10 111
1
+−−−
−= λγγ . 
4. For the pool ( )jETu +−0 , with ( )1,,0 +−= ETj K , the following is the case: 
(A20) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
=
+
++
+− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−−−=
j
k
k
EE
EjE
jET E
kE
eRGpu
0
1
1
0 1
1
11 γλγ  
5. For the pool 00u  the following is true: 
(A21) ( )( ) −−= ∑−
=
−−−
−1
0
100
1 E
k
kEkE
kE eRGa
p
p
u λ  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]jETjjET
j
EE
E
E
pp
E
jE
eRG
p
p +−−
=
+
+
−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−−− ∑ 1111111 01
1
γλγ  
(ii) [Aggregate Pools]. 1. In the steady state, the aggregate pool 
∑
=
−−− ≡
T
ij
jiTEiE uu , 1,,1 −= Ei K , is determined by 
(A22) ( ) ( )( )∑= −−−−− −−
−=
i
k
kEkE
ki
iE eRGap
p
u
0
111
1 λγ . 
2. For the aggregate pool ∑
=
−≡
T
j
jETE uu
0
 the following is true 
(A23) ( ) ( ) EEE eRGp
p
u 111
1
+−−
−= λγ . 
3. Finally for ( )∑−
=
+−≡
ET
j
jETuu
0
00 the following steady state equation holds: 
(A24) ( )( )∑−
=
−−−
−−=
1
0
10
1 E
k
kEkE
kE eRGa
p
p
u λ . 
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Lemma A2 provides solutions of the difference Equations (A13) for the dif-
ferent types of employed workers. We use the following notation for the 
qualifying path: ( )EE RR ,,2 K=Ψ . 
Lemma A2 [Employed workers]. (i) For the pool of employed workers 
with the qualifying counter iE − , 1,,1 −= Ei K , the following holds: 
(A25) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
−=−−
−
−=−−
=−−−
=
∑−
=
−−−
−
−−
−−
+
−
1,
11
1
2,,2,
11
1,1
11
2
2
0
1
1
1
1
2
Ei
RGpa
eRGpa
Eie
RGpa
a
ieRGp
RGpa
a
e
E
k
kEkE
kE
iE
iE
EE
E
iE
λ
λ
λ
λλ
K  
(ii) By using the difference Equations (A25) we obtain:  
(A26) ( ) EEEiEiEiE eRRRfe 1,,,, +−−− = Kθ , 1,1 −= Ei K  
where for the frequencies iEf − , 2,,1 −= Ei K , the following holds: 
(A27) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]∏−
=
−
+
+
+−−−
−−
−≡
1
0
1
1
11
11
1
,,,,
i
k
kE
E
i
EEiEiE
RGpa
RGpa
RRRf
λθθ
λθθθ K  
and for 1f : 
(A28) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )2
2
0
111
11 11
,,1
,,
RGpa
RfRGpa
Rf
E
k
EkEkEkE
kE
EE λθθ
Ψθλθθ
Ψθ −−
−
≡
∑−
=
+−−−−−
−
+ , 
with 1≡Ef . 
With Lemma A2 we obtain the fractions ( )1,, +− EEiE RΨθε , see Lemma A3, 
and the conditional probabilities uu jiTEjiTE −−−− =μ , see Lemma A4. 
Lemma A3 [Fractions iE −ε ]. The fraction of employed workers with the 
qualifying counter iE −  is 
(A29) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )∑−
=
+−−−
+−−−
+−
+
=
1
1
11
11
1
,,1
,,
,,
E
k
EkEkE
EiEiE
EEiE
Rf
Rf
R
Ψθ
ΨθΨθε , 1,,0 −= Ei K . 
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Lemma A4. For the conditional probabilities uu jiTEjiTE −−−− =μ , we obtain, 
with  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )11
0
111 ,,1,, −−
−
=
+−−−+ ∑−≡ iEE
i
EiEiEEE RGRfpRF λΨθθΨθ , 
the following: 
(A30) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )111 ,,11 ++−+−− −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= EEEijjijiTE RpFRGpi
j Ψθλγγμ , 1,,0 −= Ei K ,  
 1,, −= Tij K . 
(A31) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1110 ,,11 +++−−= EEETTE RFRGpa Ψθλγμ . 
(A32) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎢⎣
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⎞
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10 11,,1 γγλΨθμ  
 ( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤− ∑
=
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k
kEkE
ki fRGap
1
11 λ , 1,,1 −= Ei K . 
(A33) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑
=
++
++
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−−−=
j
k
k
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EjE
jET E
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0
11
1
0 1
1
,,11 γΨθλγμ ,  
 ( )1,,0 +−= ETj K . 
(A34) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) −⎢⎣
⎡ −= ∑
=
−−−
−
+
i
k
kEkE
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EE fRGapRF
1
1100 1,, λΨθμ  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]⎥⎦⎤−−−⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ − +−−− ∑
−
=
+−
+
+ ET
j
jETjj
E
EE pp
E
jE
RGp
0
1
1 111
1
1
11 γλγ , 
where ( )1,, +−−− = EkEkEkE Rff Ψθ . 
2. Proofs of the Lemmas A1 – A4 
Proof of Lemma A1. (i) [JOB SEEKERS] 1. When ij = , in view of (A15) the 
statement follows directly from the equation ( )( ) ( ) ( )1111 −−−−−− −−= iTiEiiTE upu γ  
and (A14). Now, let ij > , then by virtue of (A15), we get the following 
results by induction over j: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]1[1 111 −−−−−−−−− −+−= jTiEjiTEjiTE uupu γγ  
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⎛= λγγ . 
2. With (A15), 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )]1[1 11011010 −−−−−−−−−− +−+++−= iEiEiEiEiEiEiE uuuueRGpu γγλ  
  
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]110111 111 1 −−−−−−−− +−++−− −= iEiEiEiEiE uuueRGpp γγλγ . 
We eliminate 1iEu −  and ( )11−− iEu  using (A17), and replace ( )01−− iEu  by induc-
tion over i taking into account that ( ) ( )( ) ap
p =−−
−−
11
1
1 γγ , to arrive at: 
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Collecting terms it follows: 
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3. With (A14) ( )( )100 1 EEE uupu +−= γ  results. If we eliminate 1Eu  with 
(A17) and solve for 0Eu , the statement follows. 
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4. From (A16) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]1[1 11100 −+−−+−+− −+−= jETjETjET uupu γ . If we eliminate 
( )11 −+− jETu  with (A17) and ( )10 −+− jETu  by induction over j, the statement fol-
lows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) EEEjEjj
k
k
jET eRGpE
jE
E
kE
u 1
1
1
0
0 111
1
1
1
+
++−
=
+− −−⎥⎦
⎤
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+⎢⎣
⎡ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−= ∑ λγγγ  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ∑
=
+
++ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−−−=
j
k
k
EE
EjE
E
kE
eRGp
0
1
1
1
1
11 γλγ . 
5. From (A16): 
( ) ( )( )[ ]11100100 11 uuup pu +−+−= γ . Replace 01u  with (A20), 
10u  with (A18) and 11u  with (A17), to get: ( )
( )( )⎢⎣
⎡ +−= ∑−
=
−−−
−1
1
100
1 E
k
kEkE
kE eRGa
p
p
u λ  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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⎤
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⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⎟⎟⎠
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E
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 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎢⎣
⎡ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−−−+−= ∑∑ −
=
+
−
=
−−−
− ET
j
jTE
EE
E
k
kEkE
kE
E
jE
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p
p
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1
1
1
1 1
1
11
1 γγλλ  
 ( )[ ] ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎦
⎤−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛∑−
=
−−1
0
111
E
j
jTjTjE pp
j
T
a γγ  
In view of Lemma A5 (i) below and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
1
11
E
jE
j
jE
, we can write: 
( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎢⎣
⎡ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−−−+−= ∑∑ −
=
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−
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jTE
EE
E
k
kEkE
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E
jE
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1
1
1
100 1
1
11
1 γγλλ  
     ( )[ ] ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−−−− ∑−
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jjEE p
E
jE
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1
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1
111 γγ  
 
( )
( )( )⎢⎣
⎡ −−= ∑−
=
−−−
−1
0
1
1 E
k
kEkE
kE eRGa
p
p λ  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]⎥⎦⎤−−−⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ − +−−− +−
−
=
+ ∑ jETjjET
j
EE
EE pp
E
jE
eRGp 111
1
1
11
0
1 γλγ . 
(ii) [Aggregate Pools]. The equations for the aggregate pools (A22) – 
(A24) can be derived from the steady state conditions or, as below, from 
the pool Equations (A17) – (A21).  
1. For the pool ∑
=
−−− ≡
T
ij
jiTEiE uu , in view of ∑−
=
−−−− +=
1
0
T
ij
jiTEiEiE uuu , the fol-
lowing results from (A17) and (A18): 
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 ( ) ( )( ) +−− −= ∑= −−−−−
i
k
kEkE
ki
iE eRGap
p
u
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111
1 λγ  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
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p
p
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111
1 λγ  
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( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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T
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1 11111111
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so that, in view of Lemma A5 (i) below, the statement follows. 
2. For the pool ∑
=
−≡
T
j
jETE uu
0
, we can write ∑−
=
−+=
1
0
0
T
j
jETEE uuu , so that the 
statement from (A17) for 0=i  and (A19) follows. 
3. For the pool ( )∑−
=
+−≡
ET
j
jETuu
0
00 , we can write ( )
( )∑+−
=
+−+=
1
0
0000
ET
j
jETuuu , so 
that with (A20) and Lemma A5 (ii) below, we obtain the following equa-
tion: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )∑ ∑+−
= =
+
+ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−−−−+=
1
0 0
1
1
000 1
1
111
ET
j
j
k
kj
EE
EE
E
kE
peRGpuu γλγ  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )∑+−
=
+−
+
+ −−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−−−+=
1
0
1
1
00
]11[
1
1
1
11
ET
j
jET
jj
EE
EE
p
p
p
E
jE
eRGpu γλγ . 
If we replace 00u  using (A21), the proposition follows. 
Proof of Lemma A2. (i) 1. For Ee , we get with 0=i  from (A13): ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) [ ]11111 11 −−−++ +++−++−= EEEEEEEEEEE uupeRGpeRGeRGpeRGe λλλλ . 
If we replace 1−+ EE uu  using (A22) and (A23) and solve for 1−Ee , we ob-
tain the first line of (A25). 
2. For 2,,1 −= Ei K , we obtain the following from (A13), in view of (A22): 
 ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1111 +−+−−+−−− ++−= iEiEiEiEiEiE pueRGpeRGe λλ  
  ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )∑+
=
−−−
−+
+−− −−+−−=
1
0
1
1
1 1111
i
k
kEkE
ki
iEiE eRGapaeRGp λλ  
  ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )∑
=
−−−
−
+−− −−+−−=
i
k
kEkE
ki
iEiE eRGapaaeRGpa
0
11 1111 λλ  
  ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) iEiEiE apueRGpa −+−− +−−= 111 λ  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ]]11[[]11[ 111 iEiEiEiEiE eRGpeaeRGpa −−−−−+−− −−−+−−= λλ , 
where we make use of (A13) to derive the last equation. Rearranging 
terms gives: 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )111 ]11[]11[ +−−−−−−−− −−=−−+− iEiEiEiEiEiE eRGpaeRGpaeea λλ . 
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By induction over i, we get: ( ) ( )( ) ( )11 ]11[ −−−−− =−− iEiEiE aeeRGpa λ . Replacing 
the LHS and solving for ( )1+− iEe  gives the second line of (A25). 
3. For 1e  and 1−= Ei , 01 pue =  results from (A13), with (A24) we get: 
=1e ( ) ( )( )∑−
=
−−−
−−
1
0
11
E
k
kEkE
kE eRGap λ . From the last equation, it follows that 
( ) ( ) +−= 121 1 eRGpae λ  ( ) ( )( )∑−
=
−−−
−−
2
0
11
E
k
kEkE
kE eRGap λ . If we solve for 1e , we 
get the last line of (A17). 
(ii) The expression (A26) is derived from (A13) by virtue of (A27) and 
(A28). 
 
Proof of Lemma A3. In view of (A26) we can write EiEiE f εε −− = . From this, 
we can conclude that ∑∑ −= −−= − =−= 1111 1 Ei iEEEEi iE fεεε , so that  
 ( )
( )( )∑−
=
+−−−
+
+
=
1
1
11
1
,,1
1
,,
E
i
EiEiE
EEE
Rf
R
Ψθ
Ψθε . 
Inserting this expression into EiEiE f εε −− =  gives the statement (A29). 
Proof of Lemma A4. The conditional probabilities jiTE −−μ  - that an applicant 
has iE −  qualifying points and a residual claim to the UB b of jT −  peri-
ods – directly follow from Lemma A1, where we make use of Lemma A5 
(i) below. 
3. Lemmas A5 
Lemma A5. (i) Let 11 ≥+≥ iT , then the following equation holds: 
(A27) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )∑∑ +−
=
+−−
=
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−+−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
0
1
0
1111111
iT
j
jjijTjT
i
j
j p
j
ji
ppp
j
T γγγγ . 
(ii) Let 1+≥ ET , then we can prove: 
(A28) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
p
p
p
E
jE
E
kE
p
jET
j
ET
j
jk
ET
j
j
k
j ]11[1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
0 0
+−+−
=
+−
= =
−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
+−− ∑∑ ∑ γγ . 
Proof of Lemma A5. (i) 1. Let 0=i , then clearly 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) 11111 1
0
=−−−+− ∑−
=
T
j
jjTT ppp γγγ  holds. 
2. Assume the statement is true for i, then for 1+i  and 2+≥ iT  with 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )∑∑ +−
=
+−−+
=
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++−−+−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛≡
2
0
2
1
0
1
1
11111
iT
j
jjijTjT
i
j
j p
j
ji
ppp
j
T
TRHS γγγγ  
it follows that 
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( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )⎢⎣
⎡ +−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛
+−−+=
+−+−+ 111 1
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111 iTiTi p
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pTRHS γγ  
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 ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−−−+=
+−+−+
i
T
i
T
pp iTiTi
1
1
1111 111 γγ  
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⎜⎜⎝
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The second summand in the above equation is equal to zero! We prove 
this statement by induction over the benefit duration 2+≥ iT . Clearly, for 
2+= iT , ( ) 12 =+iRHS  holds. For the conclusion from T to 1+T , in view 
of the induction hypothesis, it then holds that: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−⎟⎟⎠
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+⎟⎟⎠
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11111 1 γγ  
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⎤⎢⎣
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T
pp iTiTiTiTi γγγ
1= . 
(ii) 1. If 1+= ET , then ( ) ( ) 1== TLHSTRHS  is true. 2. For the conclusion 
from T to 1+T  we develop the RHS of the Equation (A28): 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
p
pp
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jET
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ET
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⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
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−+⎟⎟⎠
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( )1+= TLHS . 
C. Reservation Income and Rents (Lemma A6) 
With Lemma A6 we convert the guarantee income of the workers and the 
qualifying rents into expressions which depend on the model parameters, 
the tightness of the labor market and the asset values of the occupied 
jobs. 
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Lemma A6 (i) [Reservation Income]. 1. The reservation income of a 
job seeker who neither owns qualifying points nor claims for unemploy-
ment benefits is: 
(A37) ( )( ) ( ) 1100 111 −−−+= ρΠβ
β
p
p
zrU . 
2. The value of a job seeker who does not have qualifying points, but still 
has claims to UB after 1,, −= TEj K  periods of unemployment is: 
(A38) ∑−
=
− +=
jT
k
k
jT dbUU
1
000 , 
where ( ) ( )[ ]( )( ) 111 1 <−− −≡ βθ θρθ p pd . 
3. For the reservation income of an insider with a qualifying counter equal 
to iE − , 1,,1 −= Ei K , the following is true  
(A39) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )∑
−−
=
−+−
−−
− −−−+−−+=
1
0
1
1
10 1111
1
11
iE
k
kiE
kiE
iE rp
p
p
p
zrU Πτργβ
βρΠτβ
β , 
where ( ) 1
1
1 <−
−≡ ργ
γρτ . 
4. The value of a job seeker with a current spell of unemployment of 
length 1,, −= Tij K  and iE −  qualifying points, 1,,1 −= Ei K , is: 
(A40) ∑−
=
−−− +=
jT
k
k
iEjiTE dbUU
1
0 . 
5. For the reservation income of an insider with a completed qualifying 
period we have 
(A41) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )∑
−
=
−−
−
−−−
+−−++−
−
−
−−=
1
0
1
1
1
1
111
1
111
1
1
11
E
k
kE
k
E
T
ET
r
p
p
p
p
zb
d
dd
rU
Πτργβ
β
ρΠτβ
β
ργ
γρ
. 
6. A job seeker with a completed qualifying period and residual claims to 
UB over jT −  periods, Tj ,,1K= , has the value: 
(A42) 
( )∑−−=− −=
T
jTk
k
ETjET dbUU
1
. 
(ii) [Rents]. 1. From (A39) we get the qualifying rent for a match that 
makes a transition from ( )1+− iEe  to iEe −  with: 
(A43) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )∑+−
=
+−−+−+−− −−−−=−
1
0
1010 11111
iE
k
kiEkiE
k
iEiE p
p
UU ΠΠτργβ
β
. 
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2. Lemma 4, Equation (31), shows that for two workers with a completed 
qualifying period – one is an outsider, the other an insider -, the outsider 
has the weaker bargaining position. The side payment he must accept is 
given by (A42)  
(A44) 
( )∑−−=− =−
T
jTk
k
jETET dbUU
1
. 
3. If we compare two workers with iE −  qualifying points – one is an out-
sider with a residual benefit duration of jT −  periods, the other is an in-
sider -, then the outsider is better off, (see Lemma 4, Equation (31)), be-
cause he receives a wage bonus for which, with (A40): 
(A45) ∑−
=
−−− =−
jT
k
k
iEjiTE dbUU
1
0 . 
Proof of Lemma A6. (i) 1. The statement follows with Ei = , Tj =  from 
the asset Equations (A6), (A8) and the sharing rule (A5). 
2. Assume Ei =  and 1,, −= TEj K  then from the asset Equations (A6), 
(A8) and the sharing rule (A5) we get: 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]100010 111111 +−− +++−−+−−−= jTjT UbzdUppppU ββΠββ β . 
Replace )1(1Π  using (A37), and solve the difference equation to derive the 
statement. 
3. From the asset Equation (A8), the sharing rule (27) and the Equation 
(A6) for the initial value of a filled job, we get 
 ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]0110 111111 +−−−− −+−+−−−= iEiEiE UzppU γργρΠργβ β . 
Solve the difference equation, replace 00U  with Equation (A37) and the 
statement follows. 
4. With the asset Equation (A8), the sharing rule (A5) and the initial value 
of a filled job (A6) we obtain the following difference equation in the bene-
fit duration jT − : 
(A46) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]111
01
1
11
111
+−+−+−−
−−−−−
−+++
+−+−−−=
jTiEjiTE
iEiEjiTE
UUbzd
U
p
p
U
γγ
βΠββ
β
 
First, we show that the proposition holds for 1=− jT . For 1=− jT , we 
can derive from (A46) that 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]010
011
1
11
111
+−−
−−−−
−+++
+−+−−−=
iEiE
iEiEiE
UUbzd
U
p
p
U
γγ
βΠββ
β
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If we replace ( )01+− iEU  with (A39), we get: 
( )
( )
( )
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⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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If we substitute the expression in the last brackets with (A39) by 
zrU iE −− 0  and rearrange, we obtain the statement: dbUU iEiE += −− 01 . For 
the conclusion from jT −  to ( )1−− jT  we eliminate jiTEU −−  and ( ) jTiEU −+− 1  
in (A46) with (A40) and obtain ( ) += −−−− 01 iEjiTE UU
( )∑−−
=
1
1
jT
k
kdb . 
5. With (A8), (A6) and the sharing rule (14), we obtain the following 
equation for the guarantee value of an insider with a completed qualifying 
period, ETU : 
(A47) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1111 1111 −−−+ −++++−−= TEETEET UUbzppU γγρΠββ . 
To solve the difference equation, we need to know the guarantee value of 
a job seeker with a completed qualifying period and an unemployment 
spell of one period, 1−ETU . The value 11 −− TEU  results from (A40). 
With (A8), (A6), the sharing rule (A5) and the wage Equation (31) we get: 
(A48) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] +−+−−−= +− ETEjET UppU βΠββ β 11111 1  
  ( ) ( ) ( )]1[ 111 +−−+− −+++ jTEjET UUbzd γγ . 
Solve the difference Equation (A48) to obtain: 
(A49) 
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ++−−+−+−−−−−=
−
+
−
− bzdd
d
U
d
d
p
p
U
jT
ETE
jT
jET γ
γβΠγ
γ
ββ
β
1
1
11
1
1
111 1
 ( ) ( ) ( )∑−
=
+−−
− −+
jT
k
kjTE
k
E
jT UdUd
1
10
1 γγ
γγ . 
For 0EU , we get from (A8), (A6), the sharing rule (A5) and the wage 
Equation (31): 
(A50) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] +−++−−−= + ETEE Upp pU βΠβργβ β 11111 10  
      
( )
( )( ) ( )[ ]10111 1 −−++−− − EUzpp p γβργρ . 
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Insert (A50) and (A47) in (A49), to obtain the following equation for 
1=j : 
(A51) 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
( ) +−
−+−+−−−=−+ +−−− b
d
z
p
p
UU
T
ETEET ργ
γργ
ργ
γρΠργβ
γβγγ
11
1
111
1 1111  
 ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−−
+−−++−
− ∑−
=
+−−−
1
0
1110 11
11
1
1 T
k
kTE
k
E
T Ud
p
pp
Ud γβ
βργγργ
γ
. 
Inserting (A51) into (A47) the statement follows by virtue of (A39) and 
(A40).  
6. From (A47) and (A48) we can deduce that 
(A52) ( ) ( ) ( )][1][ 111111 +−−−−+−−− −−+−=− jTETEjETETjETET UUdUUdUU γγ . 
Solving this difference equation we arrive at: 
(A53) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]∑
=
+−−−−
−
−− −−+−=−
m
k
kjTEkTE
k
EmET
m
jETET UUddUUdUU
1
11
1
0 1 γγγ , 
where jTm −= . 
For 0EmET UU −−  we obtain from (A48), (A50) and (A45): 
(A54) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( )∑ ∑+−
=
+−
=
−+−
− ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++−=−
1
1 1
1
01
1
0 11
mT
g
gmT
k
kg
EE
mT
EmET dddbUUdUU γγγ , 
as we will prove by induction over m. For 1=m , the following results from 
(A48), (A50) and (A45): 
 [ ] ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++−=− ∑−
=
−−
2
1
0201 11
T
k
k
EETEET ddbUUdUU γγ . 
From this equation, we obtain: 
 ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −++−=− ∑+−
=
+−−
1
1
010 11
mT
k
k
EmETEmET ddbUUdUU γγ . 
The solution of this difference equation gives (A54). 
From (A42), (A47) and (A50) we get: dbUU EE =− 01 . Inserting this ex-
pression into (A54), considering jTm −= , we get:   ( ) ( )ddbdUU jEmET −−=−− 110 . Using this equation in (A53) and rearrang-
ing terms gives the statement by virtue of (A42), from which: 
( ) =− +−−−− kjTEkTE UU 11  ( )∑−
=
−+−
1
0
1
j
n
nkjT dbd . 
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